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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, a successful litigant is generally not entitled to 
recover attorneys’ fees from the opposing party absent specific statutory 
or contractual authorization.  This basic principle is commonly referred 
to as the American Rule.  Minnesota recognized and adopted the 
American Rule roughly 125 years ago.  A limited number of exceptions 
to this longstanding rule exist, but Minnesota courts have generally been 
reluctant to expand or add to these exceptions.  In Minnesota, an 
 
†   John M. Bjorkman is a partner at the law firm of Rider Bennett, LLP in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota.  Mr. Bjorkman is a graduate of the University of Michigan, and 
he graduated, Order of the Coif, from the University of North Dakota School of Law.  
Mr. Bjorkman’s practice is focused on insurance coverage litigation, and he is chair-elect 
of the American Bar Association’s Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section’s Insurance 
Coverage Litigation Committee.  The views expressed in this article are those of the 
author and not the clients he represents. 
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exception to the American Rule exists for fees incurred in a declaratory 
action to establish insurance coverage but only if the insurer has 
breached its duty to defend. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court created this exception almost forty 
years ago, and there have been numerous attempts to expand it, including 
the recent attempt by 3M and its amicus allies, the Commissioner of 
Commerce and the Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association.  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this most recent attempt to expand the 
Morrison exception to the American Rule in In re Silicone Implant 
Insurance Coverage Litigation1 and reaffirmed that attorneys’ fees are 
recoverable in a declaratory judgment action only when the insurer 
breaches its contract with the insured by refusing to defend.  This article 
will outline the historical underpinnings of the American Rule and its 
development under Minnesota law.  It will also analyze the Morrison 
exception and the import of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s adherence to 
the narrow exception to the American Rule it carved out roughly four 
decades ago. 
II. THE AMERICAN RULE 
The American Rule can be traced back to the formation of the 
United States.2  The American Rule represents the basic proposition that 
a losing litigant generally has no obligation to pay the prevailing party’s 
legal fees.3  A number of factors likely contributed to the American legal 
system’s departure from the loser-pays approach followed under English 
law.4  Perhaps the most commonly cited explanation for development of 
the American Rule is the belief that a contrary rule would stifle access to 
the judicial system because of the threat that attorneys’ fees might be 
awarded to the prevailing party.5 
The American Rule has withstood numerous challenges, and courts 
in the United States have steadfastly refused to adopt a “loser-pays” 
approach with respect to an adversary’s attorneys’ fees.  In Alyeska 
 
1. 667 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 2003). 
2. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation:  The 
Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570-77 (1993) (discussing 
the early development of the American Rule). 
3. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363 (1851); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 
(1796) (stating that the general practice of the United States is against allowing recovery 
of attorneys’ fees as damages). 
4. See Vargo, supra note 2, at 1570-77. 
5. Id. 
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Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,6 the United States Supreme 
Court outlined the historical underpinnings of the American Rule and 
refused to depart from it.  In particular, the Court noted: 
We do not purport to assess the merits or demerits of the 
“American Rule” with respect to the allowance of attorneys’ 
fees.  It has been criticized in recent years, and courts have 
been urged to find exceptions to it. . . . But the rule followed in 
our courts with respect to attorneys’ fees has survived. It is 
deeply rooted in our history and in congressional policy; and it 
is not for us to invade the legislature’s province by 
redistributing litigation costs . . . .7 
More contemporary explanations for the development and 
continued adherence to the American Rule are that the uncertainties of 
litigation do not warrant penalizing an unsuccessful litigant with the 
burden of paying the prevailing party’s legal fees and that litigation over 
those fees would place an undue burden on the judicial system.8 
III. THE AMERICAN RULE: A MINNESOTA PERSPECTIVE 
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the American Rule more 
than 125 years ago.9  In 1874, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Kelly v. 
Rogers held that a successful plaintiff was not entitled to recover 
attorneys’ fees incurred in proving he had been defrauded by the 
defendant. 10  The court reasoned: 
It is perfectly well settled that the fees of attorneys and 
counsel, and other expenses of the litigation, beyond legal 
costs, cannot be recovered by the plaintiff in any actions of 
contract, or in those actions of tort in which punitive damages 
are not allowed; for, first, these expenses are not the legitimate 
consequence of the tort or breach of contract complained of; 
second, to allow these expenses to the plaintiff, which are 
never allowed to a successful defendant, would give the former 
an unfair advantage in the contest; and, third, where, as in this 
state, it is provided by statute that “the prevailing party may be 
allowed certain sums, termed costs, by way of indemnity for 
his expenses in the action,” it is not in the power of courts or 
 
6. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
7.  Id. at 270. 
8. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 
(1967); Vargo, supra note 2, at 1635. 
9. Kelly v. Rogers, 21 Minn. 146 (1874). 
10. Id. at 152-53. 
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juries to increase the allowance fixed by statute, however 
inadequate that allowance may be.11 
Three years later, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the 
American Rule in Frost v. Jordan,12 a contract action, and held that the 
prevailing defendant was not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees.13  In 
doing so, the court recognized the unfairness and abuse that would result 
from a contrary rule.  In particular, the court noted: 
There is no fixed standard of the value of attorney’s fees.  
Some counsel charge more than others for the same services, 
and some clients will pay more than others; and when both 
client and counsel know that the fees are to be paid by the 
other party there is a great danger of abuse.  In the next place, 
it is against the analogies of the law to allow expenses of 
litigation beyond the costs allowed by statute, which, as said 
before, however inadequate, are the measure of indemnity 
which the law provides.  In actions of contract and of tort, in 
which punitive damages are not allowable, it is uniformly held 
that attorney’s fees cannot be recovered.  This is also the 
prevailing and better opinion, even as to actions in tort, where 
exemplary damages are allowable.  Of course, we do not 
overlook the distinction between such cases and one like the 
present, which is on the contract of the bond; but the analogy 
consists in the fact that many of the reasons for the rule in the 
first are equally applicable to the second.  In the third place, to 
allow attorney’s fees would give the defendant in the 
attachment suit an unfair advantage over the plaintiff.14 
In 1924, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized what is often 
referred to as the third-party exception to the American Rule.  In 
Bergquist v. Kreidler,15 the plaintiff purchased a building from Elizabeth 
Kreidler based upon a representation that a tenant’s lease of the premises 
was expiring shortly and that the plaintiff would be entitled to full 
possession of the property upon completion of the purchase.16  In reality, 
the lease did not expire for two years, and the plaintiff was forced to 
bring suit against the tenant in an effort to remove him.17  That litigation 
ultimately failed, and the plaintiff then commenced suit against the 
 
11. Id. (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363 (1851)). 
12 . 37 Minn. 544, 36 N.W. 713 (1887). 
13 . Id. at  547, 36 N.W. at 715. 
14 . Id. at 546, 36 N.W. at 714 (citation omitted). 
15 . 158 Minn. 127, 196 N.W. 964 (1924). 
16 . Id. at 128 196 N.W. at 964. 
17 . Id. at 128-29, 196 N.W. at 964-65. 
4
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seller’s son.18  In that action, the court held the fees incurred in the prior 
suit against the tenant were damages and were recoverable from the 
seller’s son because of his misrepresentation.19  In essence, the court held 
that the defendant’s wrongful conduct had thrust the plaintiff into 
litigation with a third party.20  Notably, the fees incurred in litigation 
against the son were not recoverable.21  In carving out this exception to 
the American Rule, the court made clear its decision was “limited to the 
facts of this case, and that it is not intended to hold that in all cases the 
expense of litigation following torts or breaches of contract is 
recoverable.”22 
In subsequent decisions, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized 
the limited applicability of the third-party exception and continued to 
adhere to the American Rule.  For instance, in Stickney v. Goward,23 the 
court reasoned that if it allowed a prevailing party to recover attorneys’ 
fees, “no lawsuit would see the end, for immediately upon the entry of 
judgment therein the winner could start an action against the loser for the 
attorneys’ fees paid in obtaining the judgment.”24  The court again 
recognized the unfairness of any other rule and commented, “where a 
defendant prevails in the ordinary tort action, no attorneys’ fees are 
allowed him except as included in the statutory costs, and . . . equal 
justice forbids treating a plaintiff more generously than a defendant.”25 
In Smith v. Chaffee,26 the court recognized that “there are statutory 
provisions for allowing attorneys’ fees to the successful party in certain 
kinds of actions.”27  Absent such statutory provisions: 
The general rule is that a plaintiff, or a defendant, who 
succeeds in a lawsuit and is awarded and receives the statutory 
costs and disbursements taxable therein, has no further claim 
against his adversary for attorney’s fees or expenses incurred 
in the suit.  Whether the action sounds in contract or in tort 
makes no difference.28 
 
18 . Id. at 129, 196 N.W. at 965. 
19 . Id. at 129, 196 N.W. at 965. 
20. Id. at 132-33, 196 N.W. at 966. 
21 . See id. 
22 . Id. at 133, 196 N.W. at 966. 
23 . 161 Minn. 457, 201 N.W. 630 (1925). 
24 . Id. at 459, 201 N.W. at 631. 
25 . Id. 
26 . 181 Minn. 322, 232 N.W. 515 (1930). 
27 . Id. at 324, 232 N.W. at 516. 
28 . Id. 
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In Dworsky v. Vermes Credit Jewelry, Inc.,29 the court again 
addressed the third-party exception to the American Rule.  The court 
recognized that legal fees are ordinarily not recoverable as damages, 
“[b]ut where the wrongful act of the defendant thrusts the plaintiff into 
litigation with a third person, the plaintiff may recover from the 
defendant the expenses incurred in conducting the litigation against the 
third party, including attorneys’ fees.”30  This holding is not inconsistent 
with the American Rule.  It is not a “loser-pays” rule, but merely 
recognition that legal fees can, under certain narrowly defined 
circumstances, be an item of damage.  In this regard, it is even arguably 
misleading to characterize this rule as an exception to the American 
Rule. 
IV. THE MORRISON EXCEPTION 
In Minnesota, the first and only significant departure from the 
American Rule occurred in 1966.  In Morrison v. Swenson,31 the insured 
purchased an automobile liability policy.  The policy was canceled 
because a premium increase was not paid.32  The agent misled the 
insured into believing the policy had been reinstated.33  An accident 
occurred, and the insurer refused to defend.34  The insured subsequently 
prevailed in establishing the insurer was bound by the representations of 
the agent and that coverage was available.35  The court held the insured 
was entitled to recover fees incurred in the declaratory action.36  In doing 
so, the court seemingly abandoned 100 years of case law with little or no 
comment: 
The only other question remaining is whether it was proper for 
the court to permit plaintiff to recover his legal fees incurred in 
the declaratory judgment action, although the general rule is 
that legal fees are ordinarily not recoverable unless there is 
statutory authority for it. 
However, this action is in the nature of an action to recover 
damages for breach of contract.  Legal fees incurred in the 
 
29. 244 Minn. 62, 69 N.W.2d 118 (1955). 
30. Id. at 70, 69 N.W.2d at 124. 
31. 274 Minn. 127, 142 N.W.2d 640 (1966). 
32. Id. at 131, 142 N.W.2d at 643. 
33. Id. at 132, 142 N.W.2d at 644. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 137, 142 N.W.2d at 647. 
36. Id. at 138, 142 N.W.2d at 647. 
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declaratory judgment action were damages arising directly as 
the result of the breach.  We think that the injured party in an 
action of this kind ought to be permitted to recover whatever 
expenses he has been compelled to incur in asserting his rights, 
as a direct loss incident to the breach of contract.37 
The above passage is the sum and substance of the court’s holding 
on the fee issue and seems to imply that fees were recoverable as 
damages flowing from a breach of contract.  Shortly after Morrison, 
however, the court demonstrated just how limited its ruling was, and 
dispelled any notion that any breach of contract could give rise to an 
award of attorneys’ fees by making it clear that a breach of the duty to 
defend was required.38 
Case law immediately following Morrison demonstrates that the 
court recognized just how far it had strayed from the American Rule and 
clearly shows an effort by the court to limit the scope and potential 
impact of such a departure.  For instance, in Abbey v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, the court indicated that in Morrison, it was actually applying 
the third-party exception to the American Rule, not creating a new 
exception.39  In particular, the court noted: 
While in Morrison we held, as an exception to the general rule, 
that a party who is thrust into litigation with a third person by 
reason of a wrongful act of another in breach of contract may 
recover attorneys’ fees incurred in such prior litigation in an 
action against the one who committed such wrongful act, this 
court again later affirmed the general rule that attorneys’ fees 
are allowed only when authorized by statute or provided for in 
the contract.40 
Contrary to the court’s characterization, Morrison was not simply 
the court’s application of the third-party exception to the American Rule 
 
37. Id. at 138, 142 N.W.2d at 647 (citations omitted). 
38. See Iowa Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 276 Minn. 
362, 366, 150 N.W.2d 233, 236 (1967) (limiting recovery to situations involving a breach 
of contract action between insurer and insured); Abbey v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 281 Minn. 
113, 119, 160 N.W.2d 709, 712 (1968) (denying recovery of attorneys’ fees because 
wrongful refusal to pay disability benefits does not entitle insured to recover attorneys’ 
fees); Rent-A-Scooter, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 285 Minn. 264, 168-69, 
173 N.W.2d 9, 11-12 (1969) (limiting recovery of attorneys’ fees to actions where the 
insurer erroneously denies its obligation to defend); Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. 
Co., 284 Minn. 498, 507-08, 170 N.W.2d 581, 587 (1969) (denying recovery of 
attorneys’ fees not resulting from a breach of contract). 
39. 281 Minn. 113, 119, 160 N.W.2d 709, 712 (1968). 
40. Id. at 119, 160 N.W.2d at 711. 
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because the court permitted the recovery of fees incurred in the prior 
litigation against the third party, as well as the fees incurred in the 
current litigation against the insurer.  The Abbey decision does, however, 
demonstrate the court was not entirely comfortable with the inroad on the 
American Rule it had created just two years earlier, nor was it willing to 
expand that inroad further. 
The court’s unwillingness to expand Morrison was again evident in 
Rent-A-Scooter, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co.41  In Rent-
A-Scooter, the court, again, specifically limited its holding in Morrison.42  
In fact, the court’s ruling makes it clear that Morrison does not stand for 
the proposition that fees are recoverable in a declaratory action, even 
where the insurer has breached its obligation to defend, unless the 
insured has actually been thrust into litigation and forced to defend 
itself.43  In Rent-A-Scooter, the insurer denied coverage and refused to 
defend; however, the insured chose not to defend himself and, instead, 
allowed a default judgment to be entered.44  In refusing to allow the 
insured to recover attorneys’ fees, the court held: 
We hold that when an insured is compelled to defend himself 
in an action because his insurer has erroneously denied its 
obligation to defend him under its liability policy, the 
attorneys’ fees incurred in the defense of that action may be 
awarded the insured as contract damages in a subsequent 
action against the insurer; but, absent statutory authority or 
specific provision in the insurance contract itself, the insured 
may not recover attorneys’ fees in an action against the insurer 
to establish coverage under an insurance policy.  Because the 
plaintiff interposed no defense in the action against him, 
permitting the issue to be decided by default, there is no basis 
for an award to him of attorneys’ fees.45 
To the extent the Morrison decision may have implied that a breach 
of contract by an insurer gives rise to the right to recover attorneys’ fees, 
careful examination of the facts in Morrison, as well as subsequent 
decisions of the court, make it very clear just how narrow an exception to 
the American Rule the court had created.  In fact, at least one court 
concluded these subsequent decisions effectively overruled Morrison.46  
 
41. 285 Minn. 264, 173 N.W.2d 9 (1969). 




46. See W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Polar Panel Co., 457 F.2d 957, 962 (8th Cir. 1972) 
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Although Morrison has survived as a limited exception to the American 
Rule, it clearly did not and does not stand for the proposition that a 
breach of contract gives rise to the right to recover attorneys’ fees.  
Instead, only a breach of the duty to defend that actually thrusts the 
insured into litigation and forces the insured to incur defense costs that 
he or she would not otherwise have incurred is sufficient to invoke the 
Morrison exception.  This is a significant distinction. 
V. SETTING THE STAGE FOR 3M: 
BLURRING OF THE MORRISON EXCEPTION 
The significant distinction between the type of breach needed to 
invoke the Morrison exception and any other breach of contract still 
exists in Minnesota.  Dicta in more recent case law has made this 
distinction less apparent.  This blurring of what was initially a very 
bright line gave rise to the fee dispute between 3M and its insurers.  An 
examination of recent case law highlights why the Minnesota Supreme 
Court was required to address an issue it had seemingly resolved many 
times before. 
Following Rent-A-Scooter, the Minnesota Supreme Court next 
addressed the recoverability of attorneys’ fees in a declaratory action in 
Lanoue v. Firemans’ Fund American Insurance Cos.47  The court 
rejected the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that Morrison had been 
overruled and attempted to again demonstrate the narrow scope of the 
Morrison exception.48  In analyzing Rent-A-Scooter and Abbey, the court 
noted, “This court has resisted efforts to expand the Morrison holding to 
allow collection of attorneys’ fees where the insured is seeking only 
payments under the insurance coverage.”49  In dicta, the Lanoue court 
noted that “Morrison stands for the proposition that, where an insurance 
contract is intended to relieve the insured of the financial burden of 
litigation, the insured will not be required to pay the litigation costs of 
forcing the insurer to assume that burden.”50  This proposition was later 
rejected,51 but it did spawn further imprecision in subsequent rulings. 
 
(“The holding of the court in Rent-A-Scooter seems to clearly overrule the earlier 
Morrison decision.”). 
47. 278 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 1979). 
48. See id. at 54-55. 
49. Id. at 55. 
50. Id. at 54. 
51. Am. Standard Ins. Co. v. Le, 551 N.W.2d 923, 928 (Minn. 1996). 
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For instance, in SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.,52 the 
supreme court allowed the recovery of fees in a declaratory action where 
the insurer breached its duty to defend.53  The court cited Lanoue and 
Morrison as support for its conclusion.54  In doing so, however, the 
court, again in dicta, commented, “Attorney fees are recoverable in a 
declaratory judgment action only if there is a breach of a contractual 
duty, or statutory authority exists to support such recovery.”55  Of course, 
the only contractual duty that any court had ever found gave rise to the 
right to recover attorneys’ fees was a breach of the duty to defend. 
Similarly, in American Standard Insurance Co. v. Le,56 the court 
addressed the issue of the recoverability of fees and, again, reiterated that 
Morrison was intended to be a very narrow exception to the American 
Rule.57  The court clearly intended to limit the Morrison exception to 
breaches of the duty to defend, and it noted, “with a single exception, this 
court has consistently resisted efforts to expand the Morrison holding to 
allow collection of attorney fees in actions which do not involve the 
insurer’s breach of contract by failure to assume the duty to defend.”58 
The single exception referenced by the court in Le was Economy 
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Iverson,59 which the Le court overruled to the 
extent it was, or could be interpreted to be, inconsistent with Morrison.60  
The court also expressly overruled Lanoue and any other cases to the 
extent those cases could be interpreted as inconsistent with Morrison.61  
Notwithstanding the court’s clear intent of limiting the Morrison 
exception, it was again imprecise in describing the basis for its holding.  
In particular, the court commented, “The insured is not entitled to 
recover attorney fees incurred in maintaining or defending a declaratory 
action to determine the question of coverage unless the insurer has 
breached the insurance contract in some respect—usually by wrongfully 
refusing to defend the insured.”62 
 
52. 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995). 
53. Id. at 319. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. 551 N.W.2d 923 (Minn. 1996). 
57. Id. at 927-28. 
58. Id. at 926. 
59. 445 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1989). 
60. Am. Standard Ins. Co. v. Le, 551 N.W.2d 923, 927-28 (Minn. 1996). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 927. 
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VI. IN RE SILICONE IMPLANT INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION 
In In re Silicone Implant Insurance Coverage Litigation,63 3M 
sought coverage from its excess insurers for losses it sustained as a result 
of personal injury suits brought by claimants stemming from 3M’s sale 
of silicone gel breast implants.64  The insurance coverage litigation 
involved a number of substantive coverage issues, including whether 3M 
was entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs it incurred in pursuing 
the declaratory action against its insurers.65  Notably, none of the excess 
insurers had a duty to defend 3M and instead were only obligated to 
reimburse defense costs incurred by 3M if, in fact, coverage under the 
insurers’ policies were triggered.66 
With respect to the attorneys’ fee issue, the district court awarded 
fees and costs to 3M based upon its finding that the insurers had 
breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in responding to the 
personal injury claims against 3M and its efforts to obtain coverage.67  
The district court concluded that this breach fell within the Morrison 
exception to the American Rule and reasoned: 
The Insurers did not deal fairly with 3M.  Under such 
circumstances an award of attorneys’ fees is appropriate, is 
within the reasoning expressed in the duty to defend cases, and 
is required as a practical matter if commercial general liability 
insurance is to work in a coherent manner in litigious modern 
industrial society and economy.68 
The court of appeals reversed the district court’s ruling on the 
attorneys’ fee issue.69  In doing so, the court of appeals concluded that 
the Morrison exception is limited to situations involving an insurer’s 
breach of the duty to defend.70  3M and the insurers petitioned the 
Minnesota Supreme Court for further review.71  The supreme court 
accepted review of several issues, including whether attorneys’ fees were 
recoverable.  The Commissioner of Commerce and the Minnesota Trial 
Lawyers Association (MTLA) both submitted amicus briefs to the 
 
63. 667 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 2003). 
64. Id. at 408. 
65. Id. at 409. 
66  Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 423. 
69. In re Silicone Implant Ins. Coverage Litig., 652 N.W.2d 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002) rev’d on other grounds, 667 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 2003). 
70. Id. at 73. 
71. In re Silicon Implant, 667 N.W.2d at 413. 
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supreme court and argued that an award of fees was proper.72 
3M and the Commissioner of Commerce, as an amici, argued that 
an award of attorneys’ fees was proper based upon the assertion that the 
duty to pay defense costs is the functional equivalent of the duty to 
defend, and that a breach of either duty should give rise to an award of 
fees.73  3M also argued that Le permitted recovery of fees for any breach 
of contract, not simply a breach of the duty to defend.74  The supreme 
court affirmed the court of appeals’ ruling with respect to attorneys’ fees 
and held fees were recoverable only when an insurer breaches its duty to 
defend.75  The court expressly rejected 3M’s argument that the court’s 
holding in Le implied a breach, other than a breach of the duty to defend, 
could give rise to an award of attorneys’ fees.76  Furthermore, the court 
refused to equate a breach of the duty to reimburse defense costs with a 
breach of the duty to defend.77  In doing so, the court noted, “if an 
insurer breaches its duty to defend, the insured must do twice what it 
contracted to avoid: hire attorneys and manage a lawsuit for both the 
underlying case and the declaratory proceeding.”78  Conversely, in the 
reimbursement situation, an insured, such as 3M, often has specifically 
contracted to retain the right to hire attorneys and control the underlying 
litigation against it. 
The supreme court correctly concluded that the duty to pay defense 
costs is not the functional equivalent of the duty to defend.79  A breach of 
the duty to defend requires the insured to defend itself.  The insured is 
thrust into litigation and forced to handle issues it contractually tried to 
avoid, such as selecting an attorney, administering the claim, and making 
settlement decisions.  On the other hand, the duty to reimburse defense 
costs is much more akin to the duty to indemnify because both involve 
only the insurer’s duty to pay money.  The supreme court previously held 
that when the breach of contract is limited to a breach of a duty to pay, 
attorneys’ fees incurred by the insured in forcing the insurer to make that 
payment are not recoverable.80  Where the policy merely requires 
 
72. Id. at 408. 
73. See id. at 424. 
74. See id. 
75. Id. at 425. 
76. Id. at 424-25. 
77. Id. at 425. 
78. Id. 
79. See id. at 424. 
80. See, e.g., Garrick v. Northland Ins. Co., 469 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1991); Rent-
A-Scooter, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 285 Minn. 264, 268-69, 173 N.W.2d 
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reimbursement of defense costs, the insured, in defending itself, is not 
being asked to do anything more than it contractually agreed to do.  
Consequently, the rationale for the Morrison exception to the American 
Rule is not present. 
The MTLA urged the court to allow a recovery of attorneys’ fees on 
the ground that attorneys’ fees are an element of damage caused by a 
“bad-faith” breach of contract.81  The MTLA further urged the court to 
overturn the long line of Minnesota cases that recognize a bad-faith 
breach of contract does not give rise to extra-contractual damages.82  
According to the MTLA, much has changed, and “this country has come 
a long way” since the court first recognized that a “bad-faith” breach of 
contract does not give rise to extra-contractual damages less than twenty-
five years ago.83  In reaching the conclusion attorneys’ fees were not 
recoverable, the court did not directly address the MTLA’s assertions, 
but it did rely upon Minnesota common law that “each party bears [its] 
own attorney fees in absence of statutory or contractual exception.”84  
The court also rejected the assertion that fees were recoverable as 
damages flowing from breach of the implied covenant of good faith since 
3M failed to establish that any damages flowed directly from the 
breach.85  Finally, the court acknowledged the limited exception it 
created in Morrison and, again, reaffirmed its unwillingness to expand 
that exception.86 
The MTLA’s position that fees were recoverable as damages 
obviously ignores the American Rule.  In addition, in a third-party case, 
a policyholder faced with a recalcitrant insurer is not, as the MTLA 
suggested, left without protection for “bad faith” breaches of contract.  In 
third-party insurance cases, Minnesota already provides policyholders 
with distinct advantages over insurers.  The rules of policy interpretation 
 
9, 11-12 (1969). 
81. Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association at 8, In re 
Silicone Implant Ins. Coverage Litig., 667 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 2003). 
82. Id.  See Morris v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Minn. 
1986); Minnesota-Iowa Television Co. v. Watonwan T.V. Improvement Ass’n, 294 
N.W.2d 297, 309 (Minn. 1980); Haagenson v. Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 
277 N.W.2d 648, 652 (Minn. 1979); Olson v. Rugloski, 277 N.W.2d 385, 387-88 (Minn. 
1979); Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 440-41, 234 N.W.2d 775, 789-90 (1975). 
83. Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association at 6, In re 
Silicone Implant Ins. Coverage Litig. 
84. In re Silicone Implant Ins. Coverage Litig., 667 N.W.2d 405, 422 (Minn. 2003) 
(quoting Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2002)). 
85. Id. at 423. 
86. Id. at 424-25. 
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and construction strongly favor policyholders.87  In addition, a wrongful 
denial of coverage, or even a reservation of rights under certain 
circumstances, gives the policyholder the option to avoid all personal 
liability and enter a confessed judgment that is enforceable only against 
the insurer.88  Further, an insurer that acts in bad faith and refuses to 
settle a claim within its policy limits subjects itself to extra-contractual 
damages.89  Given the alternative protections afforded to insureds, there 
was simply no compelling reason for the court to ignore not only the 
American Rule but decades of Minnesota case law refusing to recognize 
a claim for bad faith breach of contract. 
VII. RATIONALE FOR LIMITING THE MORRISON EXCEPTION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s refusal to expand the Morrison 
exception was sound.  A contrary rule completely disregards the 
American Rule with respect to its application to contractual disputes and 
would have flooded the court system with legal fee disputes.  The first 
wave of litigation would involve parties attempting to gain special 
exemption status.  If any breach of an insurance contract is sufficient to 
give rise to the right to recover legal fees, why should the rule be limited 
to insurance contracts, and if allowed for breach of any contract, then 
why only contracts?  For instance, why should an individual who has 
been injured by a wrongful act and been forced to sue to seek 
compensation for those injuries be precluded from recovering legal fees 
necessitated by that wrongful act?  The answer in this state for more than 
125 years has been the American Rule.90 
Once the initial litigation creating and identifying those classes of 
claimants entitled to exemption from the American Rule was complete, 
the court system would next be forced to deal with the reality that every 
case falling within one of those special status categories will involve a 
claim for attorneys’ fees.  The supreme court recognized long ago that 
allowing a party to recover attorneys’ fees gives that party an unfair 
litigation advantage over his or her opponent.91  No litigant will give up 
 
87. See Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn. 1989) (“Any 
ambiguity in the insurance contract must be construed in favor of the insured.”); Atwater 
Creamery Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 276 (Minn. 1985) 
(“Exclusions in insurance contracts are read narrowly against the insurer.”). 
88. See Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729, 732 (Minn. 1982). 
89. See Short v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384, 387-88 (Minn. 1983). 
90. Id. at 713-14. 
91. See Stickney v. Goward, 161 Minn. 457, 458, 201 N.W.2d 630, 630 (1925); 
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the advantage provided by the existence of such a claim.  In addition, if 
the court had permitted the recovery of fees for a breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, every declaratory action would 
have become a battleground over that issue.  The existence of a claim for 
“bad faith” is, unlike the majority of coverage disputes, highly factual in 
nature, requiring extensive discovery and, ultimately, resolution by a 
jury.  This fact would undeniably complicate insurance coverage cases 
by increasing discovery burdens, delaying resolution, and creating a 
morass of attorney-client privilege issues.   
Finally, expansion of the Morrison exception would force the court 
system to deal with disputes over the reasonableness and necessity of the 
legal fees incurred by the prevailing party.92  Courts have also 
recognized that litigating these types of issues creates undue burdens on 
the court system.93  As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted more than 
seventy-five years ago, if the court were to permit the recovery of fees, 
“no lawsuit would see the end.”94 
A rule requiring a breach of the duty to defend at least has the 
benefit of establishing a bright line.  This bright-line rule is less likely to 
lead to ancillary disputes.  Moreover, a bright-line rule requiring a breach 
of the duty to defend distinguishes insurance contracts from other types 
of contracts.  As the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized over a decade 
ago in addressing another attempt to expand the Morrison exception, “If 
the change in Minnesota’s historical doctrine is to be made, it seems to 
us that this argument ought to be directed to the legislature.”95  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Morrison decision was Minnesota’s first and only significant 
departure from the American Rule.  The rationale for such a departure is 
not readily apparent from the Morrison decision itself.  The Morrison 
 
Frost v. Jordan, 37 Minn. 544, 546, 36 N.W. 713, 714 (1887); Kelly v. Rogers, 21 Minn. 
146, 152-53 (1874). 
92. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 
(1967) (“the time, expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of 
what constitutes reasonable attorney’s [sic] fees would pose substantial burdens for 
judicial administration”). 
93. See F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974) (permitting 
recovery of fees gives “us pause even though courts have regularly engaged in that 
endeavor in the many contexts where fee shifting is mandated by statute, policy, or 
contract”); Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718. 
94. Stickney, 161 Minn. at 459, 201 N.W. at 631. 
95. Garrick v. Northland Insurance Co., 469 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. 1991). 
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exception to the American Rule has, however, survived and, despite 
repeated attempts, has never been expanded.  The Morrison decision and 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s subsequent application and 
interpretation of that decision demonstrate quite clearly that the 
exception created is a very limited exception.  The court’s decision in In 
re Silicone Implant Insurance Coverage Litigation reaffirms the narrow 
scope of the Morrison exception and, perhaps, finally puts to rest further 
attempts to expand that exception.  While an exception to the American 
Rule for a breach of the duty to defend has questionable historical roots, 
it at least has the virtue of fixing a bright line that will not unduly 
complicate future litigation with ancillary issues. 
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss2/8
